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Russia—EU: Competing Logics of 
Region Building
by Andrey Makarychev
In this paper I will argue that Russia and the European Union have different 
visions of  their roles and instruments in their common neighborhood. Russia 
treats most ex-Soviet states as “naturally” belonging to the zone of  its vital inter-
ests, hence the “near abroad” concept and the concomitant reluctance to admit 
any role for Western institutions in the region. The EU in turn relies mostly on 
its “soft power” resources, including norm projection, in order to foster domestic 
transformation in the neighboring countries and make them more compatible with 
the European understanding of  partnership. Yet despite these obvious differences, 
there are similarities between Russia and the EU as well. Each tries to distance 
itself  from the other party through a variety of  means. Russia wishes to install 
its political and security monopoly in the “near abroad” by claiming that regional 
problems have to be resolved on the regional level, i. e. without involvement from 
the outside. The EU however increasingly prefers to focus on “regions-in-the-
making” where Russia is viewed as an external power rather than as a constitutive 
member of  regional structures (such as the South Caucasus region and Central 
Asia). As a result of  this mutual “othering” (i. e. ascribing characteristics of  differ-
ence), both Russia and the EU develop their own policy instruments and strategies 
for the common neighborhood instead of  engaging neighboring countries in full-
fledged cooperation. Both Russian and EU policies lack elements of  inter-subjec-
tive interaction with their neighbors, which makes the Eastern Partnership more 
of  an EU policy tool rather than a common forum of  co-partnership with Eastern 
European and Caucasian countries. In a similar vein, the Customs Union project is 
more of  a reflection of  Russia’s great power ambitions in the post-Soviet area than 
a common approach jointly coordinated by all participating countries. This is one 
explanation for the preponderance of  bilateral relations that both Moscow and 
Brussels develop with individual countries over more institutionalized forms of  
multilateral cooperation. Another possible explanation is the continuous process 
of  disaggregation and fragmentation within this vast zone of  the common neigh-
borhood, which makes all attempts to propose broad institutional frameworks (like 
CIS institutions or the Eastern Partnership) dysfunctional.
Yet Russia and the EU will eventually have to find not only a more cooperative 
modus operandi in managing the projects of  common interest in their shared neigh-
borhood, but also to systematically engage its neighbors in multilateral projects. 
Arguably, the best pathway to achieve these goals is through region building aimed 
at strengthening regional institutional clusters. This process is dependent on a 
number of  factors, among which regional identities plays the crucial role. In this 
paper I will dwell upon four regions-in-the-making located at the intersection of  
EU-Russia spheres of  interests: Nordic Europe, the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and 
the Caspian Sea regions.
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Russland-EU: Konkurrierende Ansätze 
von Regionenbildung
von Andrey Makarychev
In dieser Analyse wird argumentiert, dass Russland und die Europäische Union (EU) 
unterschiedliche Sichtweisen ihrer Rollen und Instrumente in ihrer gemeinsamen 
Nachbarschaft haben. Russland behandelt die meisten postsowjetischen Staaten so, 
als ob sie »von Natur aus« in seine Einflusszone gehörten, woraus das Konzept des 
»Nahen Auslands« und die dazu gehörende Abneigung entstanden ist, westlichen 
Institutionen irgend eine Rolle in dieser Region zuzugestehen. Die EU wiederum ver-
lässt sich vor allem auf  ihre »Soft Power«, wozu auch die Projektion ihres Regelwerks 
gehört, um in benachbarten Ländern innenpolitische Umgestaltungen zu fördern und 
sie damit vereinbarer mit dem europäischen Verständnis von Partnerschaft zu machen. 
Doch trotz dieser offensichtlichen Unterschiede gibt es auch Gemeinsamkeiten zwi-
schen Russland und der EU. Jeder der beiden versucht, sich vom jeweils anderen 
mittels verschiedener Instrumente zu distanzieren. Russland möchte sein Politik- und 
Sicherheitsmonopol im »Nahen Ausland« mit der Behauptung durchsetzen, dass regi-
onale Probleme auf  der regionalen Ebene gelöst werden müssen, d. h. ohne Einmi-
schung von außen. Die EU dagegen legt zunehmend eher den Schwerpunkt auf  »sich 
bildende Regionen«, innerhalb derer Russland eher als eine auswärtige Macht denn 
als ein konstitutives Mitglied regionaler Strukturen (wie etwa der südliche Kaukasus 
und Zentralasien) gesehen wird. Als Ergebnis dieses gegenseitigen »Differenzierens« 
(also der Zuschreibung von Unterschieden) entwickeln sowohl Russland als auch die 
EU ihre eigenen Politikinstrumente und Strategien für die gemeinsame Nachbarschaft, 
anstatt die Nachbarländer in eine voll ausgebaute Zusammenarbeit einzubeziehen. 
Sowohl Russland wie der EU fehlt es an Elementen intersubjektiver Zusammenarbeit 
mit ihren Nachbarn, was die Östliche Partnerschaft (ÖP) mehr zu einem Politikin-
strument der EU macht statt zu einem gemeinsamen Forum der Teilpartnerschaft 
mit osteuropäischen und kaukasischen Ländern. Ganz ähnlich ist das Projekt der 
Zollunion eher eine Reflektion der Großmachtambitionen Russlands für das post-
sowjetische Gebiet anstatt eines gemeinsamen Vorgehens, im Einverständnis mit allen 
teilnehmenden Ländern koordiniert. Das ist eine Erklärung für das Vorherrschen von 
bilateralen Beziehungen, die sowohl Moskau wie Brüssel gegenüber einzelnen Län-
dern entwickeln anstatt mehr institutionalisierter Formen multilateraler Zusammenar-
beit. Eine weitere mögliche Erklärung ist der anhaltende Prozess der Zersetzung und 
Fragmentierung innerhalb dieser riesigen Zone der gemeinsamen Nachbarschaft, der 
alle Versuche, breit angelegte institutionelle Rahmen (wie die GUS-Institutionen oder 
die Östliche Partnerschaft) vorzuschlagen, dysfunktional macht.
Doch werden Russland und die EU letzten Endes nicht nur einen kooperativeren 
Modus operandi bei der Bewältigung der Projekte gemeinsamen Interesses in ihrer 
geteilten Nachbarschaft zu entwickeln haben, sondern auch ihre Nachbarn in multila-
terale Projekte einbeziehen müssen. Sicherlich ist der beste Weg zur Erreichung dieser 
Ziele der Aufbau von Regionen, gerichtet auf  die Stärkung von Gruppierungen von 
regionalen Institutionen. Dieser Prozess hängt von einer Reihe von Faktoren ab, wor-
unter regionale Identitäten die entscheidende Rolle spielen. In diesem Aufsatz werde 
ich mich mit vier entstehenden Regionen beschäftigen, die an den Schnittlinien zwi-
schen den Interessensphären der EU und Russlands liegen: Nordeuropa, die Ostsee-, 
Schwarzmeer- und die Region des Kaspischen Meeres.
Zusammenfassung
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Introduction
The analysis is grounded in two mutually correla-
tive arguments, one academic and one political. 
As seen from the scholarly perspective, it is the 
strengthening of  the regional management of  
global processes that, as many experts in Russia 
believe, ought to constitute the key element of  
international relations in the 21st century.1 Russia’s 
self-description as either a “regional”2 or “trans-
regional power”3 can be interpreted as an attempt 
to mildly dissociate itself  from the global-level 
agenda defined by such normative concepts as sus-
tainable development, transparency, accountability, 
good governance, human security, etc., which play 
only marginal roles in Russia’s foreign policy vocab-
ulary. This reasoning is reinforced by a political 
strategy of  “finding regional solutions to regional 
problems,” as repeatedly uttered by Russian For-
eign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who—both symboli-
cally and paradoxically—has held relations with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in higher regard than 
relations with G8 partners.4 Consequently, Russia’s 
policy of  solving international conflicts “regionally” 
is used, as the National Security Strategy suggests, 
to avoid unwelcome influence by “non-regional 
powers,”5 mainly the United States. This political 
stance could be due to Russian sympathies (which 
the Kremlin vehemently denies) with sphere of  
influence thinking, which explains Moscow’s low 
profile in situations that are territorially far away 
from Russia (such as the “Arab spring”).
Yet the practicability of  Russia’s strategy of  ques-
tioning external actors’ propriety for regional 
policies is hardly compatible with the trans-nation-
alization of  world politics. The growing structural 
complexity of  (post-)international relations dis-
cards two simplistic tenets engrained in Russian 
regionalist thinking: the alleged harmonious cor-
relation between regionalization and globalization, 
and the feasibility of  neatly dividing the interested 
actors into two categories, i. e. “insiders” and “out-
siders.” Both assumptions should be taken with 
strong reservations and placed within specific 
regional contexts. To avoid overgeneralizations, one 
has to admit that certain forms of  regionalism are 
indeed conducive to fostering trans-nationalization 
and are, therefore, globalization-friendly, while 
other regional experiences are, in contrast, mostly 
protective, inward-oriented, and do not fit the 
global world. By the same token, the distinction 
between “intra-regional” and “external” subjects 
is not always clear. For example, geographically 
the United States is an external actor in both the 
Baltic and Black Sea regions, but institutionally, as 
the core country in NATO, the US is inevitably 
involved in both regions through security commit-
ments to other members of  the North Atlantic 
alliance. Geographically, the EU is not part of  the 
Caspian Sea region, but since many European com-
panies do business there, the EU is not a complete 
outsider. This situation has practical implications 
for Russia: Instead of  developing its policy in the 
“near abroad” on a dubious strategy of  fencing 
against “outsiders,” Moscow would be better off  if  
it started investing its (rather modest) political and 
institutional resources in forging more inclusive 
associative relations with actors interested in foster-
ing region-building in the Russian-EU common 
neighborhood.
I will start my analysis by briefly describing the 
contours of  the Russian debate on regionalism. I 
will then depict the regional landscape in the EU-
Russia shared neighborhood, singling out four 
regions-in-the-making with different degrees of  
institutionalization, where interaction between Rus-
sia and the EU is the most dynamic.
Russia—EU: Competing Logics of Region 
Building
by Andrey Makarychev
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The Russian Debate on Regions 
and the Neighborhood Policy
Russian attitudes toward regionalism are still heavily 
influenced by traditional state-centric—and mostly 
hard-security-driven—power politics calculations.6 
Regionalism is often viewed as a policy of  major 
international powers that are eager to form blocs 
and alliances to serve their geopolitical purposes. 
Consequently, major world powers are believed to 
pursue policies of  hegemony by means of  build-
ing regional alliances—something similar to “the 
theory of  great power orbits,” which presumes 
that “smaller countries are hardly able to contrive 
regional integration and stability on their own.”7
There is a widespread feeling in Russia that most 
of  the broad concepts of  regionalism are grounded 
in geopolitical thinking and crafted as specific tools 
meant to boost the expansion of  the transatlantic 
community. “Central and Eastern Europe” and 
“the Greater Black Sea region” (or “the Black Sea-
Mediterranean region”) are viewed with particular 
suspicion in Russia as regional platforms aimed at 
more forcefully linking the vast Euro-Asian areas 
to the enlarging West, strengthening the pivotal 
security roles played by NATO and the EU in its 
southern and eastern peripheries, and securing 
energy transportation routes essential for the West.8 
The alleged “Caspian-Black Sea region” is seen in 
Russia as an integral part of  the US-promoted idea 
of  a “greater Middle East” stretching from Pales-
tine to Pakistan. It is perceived in Moscow as an 
attempt to detach the Central Asian countries from 
the putative Russian sphere of  influence and to 
substantiate their historically contingent inclusion 
in the USSR.9 Furthermore, by promoting a geopo-
litical vision of  the “Caspian-Black Sea region,” the 
United States and some EU members are viewing 
regionalism in terms of  energy, specifically energy 
supplies for the West. The concept of  a wider 
Baltic-Black Sea region, known as Intermarun, also 
contains elements of  separating Russia from neigh-
boring countries (like Georgia and Ukraine) that 
gravitate to the West and are not willing to stay in 
Moscow’s orbit.
But Russia itself  uses a similar logic of  wider 
regions in its foreign policy imagery. For example, 
the concept of  the “Volga-Caspian region” allows 
Russian experts to try not only to link external ter-
ritories to Russian domestic politics, but also to 
securitize this linkage by presenting the potential 
weakening of  Russia’s positions in the Caspian Sea 
region as automatically having negative domestic 
effects.10 Another example is the Black Sea-Medi-
terranean nexus which, from the viewpoint of  its 
Russian proponents, is meant to substantiate Rus-
sia’s belonging to a wider Europe and thus avoid 
Russian marginalization.11 In this light, the Kremlin 
interpreted the French project of  a Union for the 
Mediterranean as a geopolitical move aimed at 
strengthening NATO’s presence in the Mediter-
ranean and the Middle East and consolidating 
Muslim countries under the European aegis, which 
goes against Russian interests in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia. The possible counter-balance 
to an expanding West is believed to be Russia’s 
consolidation of  its own sphere of  regional influ-
ence, along with its enhanced cooperation with 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the 
Customs Union, and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization.12
In the meantime, some more pragmatic and less 
confrontational voices have also emerged in the 
Russian discourse on regionalism. In the For-
eign Policy Concept of  2000, the concept of  the 
“Larger Mediterranean” was developed to link the 
Middle East, Black Sea, and Caspian Sea regions 
where Russia is expected to play an important 
role.13 In the Concept of  2008, however, the tone 
was less ambitious: Russia declared its eagerness 
to strengthen the Organization of  the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation and the mechanisms of  the 
Caspian Sea integration,14 showing that Moscow 
looks at the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, and the 
Caspian Sea as separate regions requiring different 
levels and instruments of  Russian participation. 
The Arab Spring has confirmed the trend of  Rus-
sia’s gradual disengagement from the Mediterra-
nean region.
The new voices are even more visible in the Rus-
sian academic discourse, which admits that the 
realist reading of  regionalism through the prism 
of  spheres of  influence is increasingly insufficient 
and obsolete for a number of  reasons. First, glo-
DGAPanalyse 1 | March 2012
7
balization does matter for regions-in-the-making. 
Very often the adjective “regional” is meant to 
describe an imagined middle ground between the 
more fully conceptualized global and local levels of  
analysis.15 Other Russian scholars argue that the so 
called macro-regionalization (i. e. the formation of  
trans-national regions) is “the essence of  globaliza-
tion”16 since it decisively contributes to the gradual 
de-sovereignization of  nation states,17 regardless 
of  whether we celebrate or deplore it. Against 
this backdrop, the spectrum of  region-shapers has 
significantly widened during recent decades. In 
particular, domestic regions, along with central 
governments, are becoming more deeply involved 
in trans-border region-building processes, as exem-
plified by Russia’s North Western federative units 
more strongly gravitating toward Europe.
Second, the Russian academic discourse on region-
alism is increasingly receptive to the normative 
issues that appear to affect the logic of  region-
building. The Nordic region is often referred to 
as the best example of  the practicability of  value-
based policy as a region-building institutional tool. 
And Baltic Sea regionalism is to a significant degree 
modeled on similar normative foundations.
Third, there is a group of  constructivist scholars in 
the Russian academic community who argue that 
the “cognitive maps” of  regionalism have been 
increasingly shaped by immaterial factors (percep-
tions, imaginations, narratives, anticipations, role 
identities, etc.) as the most important shapers of  
region-building projects. Some regions (like the 
Barents-Euroarctic area) came into being as the 
result of  creative imagination and its institutional-
ization. Most regions in the EU-Russia common 
neighborhood are “spaces-in-between” which lack 
a single identity and, therefore, are keen to play 
bridge-building roles.
Therefore, it is well understood in Russia that the 
EU-Russian neighborhood is an area with a high 
density of  regional projects, initiatives, and con-
ceptions. Not all of  them are equally visible in the 
changing cognitive map of  Europe, which makes 
their identification rather important for compre-
hending the dynamics of  integrative and disintegra-
tive drives in this part of  the world.
Comparing the Four Regions of 
the Common Neighborhood
The four regions that will be analyzed are so differ-
ent that comparing them requires specific criteria. I 
will use the structure-agency approach for this pur-
pose. First, in each of  the four cases I will describe 
the structure of  the region under consideration, 
relying upon the distinction between international 
systems, societies, and communities explicated by 
Barry Buzan.18 Regional international systems 
are based upon material and physical elements—
including a state’s military capabilities and the 
movement of  goods/resources bereft of  strong 
ideational content. Regional international systems 
exist as long as their constitutive members share 
common interests that make them compatible. It 
is mainly within regional international systems 
that a realist type of  inter-state policy relations is 
possible. Regional international societies are based 
on socially constructed institutions with shared 
rules and procedures that regulate the behavior of  
regional actors who might have their own particu-
lar values and identities. In other words, common 
norms do not necessarily lead to identity-based 
solidarity beyond what is required for cooperative 
co-existence. The most important elements of  
regional international societies are rules that define 
what kind of  conduct is legitimized.19 Finally, a 
regional international community presupposes 
something more than rules and institutions—
namely, a shared culture and “normative kinship” 
grounded in affection and/or tradition, as well as a 
“we-feeling” of  belonging together and differentiat-
ing from “others.”
Second, I will explain what kind of  Russian 
agency/actorship each of  the three types of  
regional structures allows. More specifically, I will 
discuss the nature of  Russian interests in each 
region, and the forms of  Russia’s engagement with 
other players, above all the EU. Does Russia sim-
ply react to other states’ policies, or does it have 
its own policy lines? Does Russia contribute to 
institution-building, or merely receive the institu-
tional benefits of  region-building projects? These 
questions will help to better flesh out the differ-
ences between the Russian and the EU logics of  
region-making.
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Northern Europe: Common Identity, 
Different Institutions
Structural factors. Northern Europe appears to 
be the most illustrative example of  a regional 
international community based upon a com-
mon identity sustained by a set of  Nordic values. 
There are two different ways of  conceptualizing 
the Nordic identity. Intrinsically, it is manifest in 
the formation of  a “security community” based 
upon the deep de-securitization of  relations 
between its members. The most radical prospect 
here is the idea of  a “Nordic federation” that 
could play a leading role in the transformation of  
the neighboring Baltic Sea region.20 The idea of  
“North” as an identity signifier was contrived as 
an alternative to the West-East dichotomy and in 
opposition to a centralized/”imperial” model of  
(EU)rope.
Yet the Nordic community, being cemented 
by common values, still leaves ample room for 
country-specific initiatives and institutional choices. 
Thus, Iceland and Norway are members of  NATO 
but not the EU (though Norway participates in the 
EU’s Nordic Battle Group), while Finland and Swe-
den, vice versa, are members of  the EU but not 
NATO (though they are among the biggest secu-
rity contributors in NATO-led crisis management 
operations), and only Denmark participates in both 
institutions without, however, having joined the 
eurozone and the Common Security and Defense 
Policy.21
In the meantime, Nordic regionalism has its own 
external projection, as exemplified by the North-
ern Dimension initiated by Finland. Since 2006, 
the “old” Northern Dimension was reshaped into 
a multilateral institution with participation of  the 
EU, Russia, Norway, and Iceland. The Arctic area is 
seen as its key priority area, which has allowed it to 
interact more with non-European countries like the 
United States and Canada.22 The key problem with 
this extended version of  the Northern Dimension 
is that it is not fit to deal with the highly conflictual 
structure of  competitive relations in the Arctic 
area due to its lack of  universally recognized legal 
provisions and vast room for individual, self-asser-
tive, and self-justified actions in the struggle for 
resources.23
Russia’s policies. The effects of  the multiplicity of  
institutional choices in Northern Europe have 
policy implications for Russia. Flexible and adapt-
able arrangements that blur the distinction between 
“insiders” and “outsiders” may help improve Rus-
sia’s relations with Europe, since not being a mem-
ber of  the EU or NATO does not exclude neigh-
bors from closely participating in specific projects. 
All of  this is particularly relevant for Russia’s North 
West regions because the Northern Dimension 
has increased the prospects of  Europeanization 
in terms of  co-participation in common projects, 
trans-border interaction, regional networking, etc.24 
The Northern Dimension was based on conceptual 
premises such as the transformation of  borders 
from barriers to interfaces, the growing appeal of  
multi-level, trans-national, and cross-border gover-
nance, the prevalence of  soft security concerns over 
hard security, and the increasing importance of  
cultural dynamics and economic flows compared to 
state-to-state liaisons. The whole idea was grounded 
in the technocratic logic of  avoiding high politics in 
favor of  projects in ecology, infrastructure develop-
ment, urban planning, etc.25 The external projection 
of  Nordic regionalism is driven by it being a model 
that can spill over to other territories that neighbor 
the EU.26 However, in the regional milieu Russia is 
not seen as “an active agenda-setter and remains 
primarily oriented towards the safest zones of  low 
political cooperation,”27 which means that it still 
gives preference to bilateral diplomatic negotiations.
The intricacies of  Russian-Norwegian relations 
seem to be quite illustrative of  the conflictual 
nature of  bilateral bargains. Moscow was keen 
to publicly present the border delimitation treaty 
signed with Oslo in September 2010 as an exem-
plary case of  a civilized resolution to a decade-long 
territorial dispute, but at the outset the treaty was 
severely criticized by Russian experts as a unilateral 
concession.28 The detention of  a Russian fishing 
vessel by the Norwegian coast guard near Spitzber-
gen in September 2011 made clear that the two par-
ties interpret the concluded treaty differently. The 
Russian Foreign Ministry pointed to the alleged 
“political agreements” aimed at creating appropriate 
conditions for Russian fishing business after the 
treaty was signed,29 which, as seen from the Norwe-
gian vantage point, is a legally void argument.
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The case of  Northern European regionalism shows 
that identity-based forms of  regional integration 
might act as an institutional example for one group 
of  neighbors (the Baltic Sea states), remain mainly 
a discursive reference point for others’ identities 
(Russia’s northern territories), and appear to lose 
their functionality in a conflict-ridden environ-
ment dominated by the logics of  competition and 
unilateralism (the Arctic area). Characteristics of  
regional identity are therefore context-dependent 
and have diverse institutional effects in different 
social structures.
The Baltic Sea Region: Back to the 1990s?
Structural factors. The Baltic Sea region is an example 
of  regional international society, grounded in 
a peculiar combination of  networking type of  
regionalism and the great power management prac-
tices, with Russia and Germany at their core. Due 
to a multiplicity of  linguistic, cultural, and ethnic 
traditions, the region lacks a common identity. 
However, this leaves ample space for institutional 
linkages that are mostly derived from two sources: 
the EU’s normative hegemony and the transforma-
tive spillover effect of  Nordic regionalism. The 
emergence of  a new cooperative forum like the 
trilateral German-Russian-Polish policy forum has 
become an important part of  the Baltic regional 
society. In the meantime, the cohesiveness of  the 
region is confronted by a number of  challenges, 
such as the lack of  consensus among its members 
on the Nord Stream pipeline project and Moscow’s 
attempts to use the Kaliningrad exclave as its mili-
tary stronghold, as opposed to the “pilot region” 
concept widely debated in the 1990s.
Russia’s policies. The “Baltic” debate in Russia is a 
good example of  the cognitive split between aca-
demic expertise (based, by and large, on a liberal 
integrationist paradigm) and political discourse 
(which is much more state-centric and alarmist). 
From the academic perspective, Russia’s domestic 
regions adjacent to the Baltic Sea are widely per-
ceived as a peculiar part of  Russia that, due to its 
cultural, historical, and geo-economic characteris-
tics, is destined to integrate with Europe and set 
European standards for the rest of  the country.30 
Yet from a political viewpoint, there are factors 
that push the tone in a less cooperative direction. 
Even liberal experts see EU enlargement, of  which 
Baltic regionalism was a pivotal part, as a menace 
to Russian economic interests.31 In identity terms, 
for many Russian experts the pro-European Baltic 
narrative in 1990s was based on a modernist and 
essentialist presumption of  the inevitable identity 
clash between Baltic Europe and Russia as its “Big 
Other.”32 In security terms, Moscow perceives 
Baltic region-making as a mechanism for adjust-
ing the three Baltic states to EU and NATO stan-
dards. Consequently, the Kremlin believes in these 
states’ unfriendliness to Russia and their deliberate 
intention to keep Russia out of  Europe. Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov has repeatedly referred to 
Wikileaks information on NATO plans to defend 
Poland and the Baltic states from hypothetical Rus-
sian aggression as an indication of  NATO’s adver-
sarial attitude toward Moscow.33
Russia also appears to be dissatisfied with some 
of  the institutional arrangements in this region. In 
particular, it complained that the Council of  Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS) functions as an offspring of  the 
EU instead of  playing a more independent role of  
its own.34 In the meantime, Russian expectations 
of  using CBSS as a platform for putting politically 
pressure on the Baltic countries in order to change 
their policies toward Russian-speaking minorities 
have not been met.
But the Baltic Sea region maintains its importance 
for Russia for two main reasons. First, the region 
is a key element of  Russian energy security, of  
which the Nord Stream project is particularly sig-
nificant. In the energy sector, Russia’s most severe 
opponents are Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, who 
have been eager to form a bloc aimed at diversify-
ing local energy markets, connecting their energy 
facilities to EU networks, and ultimately avoiding 
overdependence on Russia. As transit countries, 
they have their own understanding of  energy secu-
rity. On the Russian side, Moscow has decided to 
discontinue oil exports through the Baltic states by 
2015.35
Yet the future of  the region’s institutional settings 
will certainly not depend on political positions 
taken by major government actors, but rather on 
an economic rationale that plays an increasingly 
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important role due to growing intra-regional inter-
dependence. For instance, Moscow is eager to 
pursue its own energy policy, as exemplified by the 
launching of  the Baltic nuclear power plant (NPP) 
in response to the closure of  the Ingalina NPP, 
which accounted for 30–40 percent of  Kalinin-
grad’s power consumption. Russia announced this 
decision in spite of  the EU’s earlier proposal to 
connect Kaliningrad to Europe through the Coor-
dination of  Transmission of  Electricity (UCTE). 
Yet the common electricity market in the Baltic 
region in fact functions as an offspring of  the EU 
system and therefore does not include Russia. As 
local experts forecast, Kaliningrad faces the peril 
of  isolation from the regional electricity market, 
which would inevitably require the integration of  
Kaliningrad’s electric power system in regional net-
works of  the UCTE. This is especially important 
against the backdrop of  the “extremely low energy 
efficiency of  Russian manufacturing industries and 
utility services,” which increases energy demand in 
Kaliningrad.36
Second, there is a wider set of  issues related to 
Kaliningrad, which still has a chance to fulfill 
its function as a “pilot region” for Russia-EU 
cooperation, but is hindered by the resilience of  
old approaches. On the one hand, there is the 
ambitious concept of  Kaliningrad as a “Russian 
Europe.” In accordance with this logic, the Rus-
sian Foreign Ministry recognized the prospect for 
a facilitated visa regime in the Baltic Sea region by 
pointing to the positive experiences of  Russian 
agreements with Norway, Poland, and Lithuania.37 
The Kremlin came up with a “72 visa-free hours” 
initiative for foreign tourists, which started despite 
some resistance from the State Border Service.38
The newly created “triangle” of  Germany-Poland-
Russia is a regional project that is expected to have 
a positive spillover effect for wider Europe. For the 
Russian Foreign Ministry, the practical importance 
of  this trilateral format boils down to Germany’s 
institutional capability to lobby for Russian-Polish 
trans-border cooperation projects in Brussels. 
Sergey Lavrov quite explicitly assumes that the 
Moscow-Warsaw-Berlin nexus will help promote 
regionally reached arrangements in the EU.39 
However, there is no Baltic consent in this matter: 
Lithuania in particular has expressed its disagree-
ment with the Russian-Polish proposals to extend 
the visa waivers agreement, initially applicable to 
the residents of  border areas, to the entire Kalinin-
grad oblast.
Yet on the other hand, the Kremlin’s policies 
toward Kaliningrad seem to be rather ambigu-
ous and highly securitized. As a retired Russian 
diplomat opines, special arrangements for Kalin-
ingrad are part of  EU efforts to diminish Russian 
influence in neighboring areas.40 Putin gloomily 
predicts that, “after solving the problem with the 
Kaliningrad oblast, the EU will block the visa-free 
talks with Russia.”41 Moscow is often insensitive to 
the economic needs of  the Kaliningrad oblast, as 
illustrated by its policy of  raising duties for foreign 
cars, which provoked harsh protests by residents 
of  the enclave who depend on vehicles imported 
from European countries. President Medvedev’s 
references to the ongoing remilitarization of  
Kaliningrad—as a response to US military plans in 
Eastern and Central Europe—reveal the resilience 
of  the Kremlin’s realpolitik logic. In this sense, the 
Putin and Medvedev presidencies resulted in a lost 
decade for Kaliningrad, where a significant part 
of  the local population consider themselves “hos-
tages to both Europe and Russia.” Kaliningrad has 
now to some extent returned to the agenda of  the 
1990s, including the issues of  the region’s particu-
larity, visa-free travel, and the recalibration of  rela-
tions with Moscow.42
The Black Sea Region as a “Conflict 
Formation”
Structural factors. The Black Sea region features a 
complicated combination of  elements that are 
pertinent to both the regional international system 
(with two main types of  “physical interactions”: 
military force and trade in energy resources) and 
regional international society (with nascent institu-
tions such as the Black Sea Economic Coopera-
tion). This region is the site of  three different 
region-building projects: Russian, European, and 
Turkish. These three powers compete with each 
other in a heterogeneous political milieu that 
stretches way beyond the group of  geographically 
littoral states: about one half  of  states that are 
members of  the Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
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have no immediate access to the Black Sea basin, 
which means that institutionally, this region tran-
scends its geographic contours.
The question of  who is deemed an “insider” and 
an “outsider” is extremely complicated in the Black 
Sea region. Russia itself  vindicates the uncertainty 
of  such a distinction: It welcomes investment 
from external financial resources (from the US, 
China, or Japan) in regional projects,43 but changes 
its tone when it comes to security matters, where 
it complains about undue and excessive external 
(essentially US) overlay. In this respect, Russia can 
find common ground with Turkey, which—in 
spite of  its NATO membership and application to 
the EU—is equally disinterested in the presence 
of  external powers around the Black Sea and the 
Caucasus, and is skeptical about the efficacy of  the 
West as a peacemaker in post-conflict situations. 
What makes Russia’s and Turkey’s policies com-
patible is their concern about the regional status 
quo and disdain for the possible negative effects 
of  extra-regional powers on the 1936 Montreux 
Convention, which regulates the transit of  warships 
and their stay in the Black Sea.44 This legal docu-
ment meets the security concerns of  major littoral 
states by imposing restrictions on external powers 
regarding the total tonnage of  military vessels and 
their presence in the Black Sea. Apart from the 
Montreux Convention, there are other institutional 
elements of  region-building in the Black Sea, which 
are patronized by Turkey and largely accepted by 
Russia (such as BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea 
Harmony projects). In the meantime, the depth of  
the Russian-Turkish partnership in the Black Sea 
region should not be overvalued: Ankara is eager 
to build “her own region”45 that could be a poten-
tial springboard to the Caucasus, Central Asia, and 
China. Turkey has tried to strike a balance between 
its wider vision of  the Black Sea as a region that 
connects three seas (Caspian, Aegean, and Mediter-
ranean), while adhering to a more formal definition 
of  the region as soon as it comes to issues of  mari-
time security.
Russia’s policies. For Russia, the Black Sea is mainly a 
security region, or a “conflict formation.” The war 
in Georgia confirmed that it is a zone of  compet-
ing interests and policies, and more of  a source of  
conflict than a potential terrain for peace and secu-
rity. An additional factor that contributes to current 
tensions is the stationing of  Russia’s Black Sea 
Fleet in Sebastopol, which became one of  the hot-
test issues in Russian-Ukrainian relations under the 
Yushchenko presidency. Against this background, 
the August 2008 war strengthened the voices of  
those who see Russia as a potential imperial power 
that threatens the independence of  its immediate 
neighbors. There is also a growing challenge from 
radical movements in the Russian North Cauca-
sus, including Circassian groups that have actively 
used diaspora groups to hamper the 2014 Winter 
Olympic Games in Sochi. Russian political attitudes 
to organizations such as GUUAM and the Com-
munity for Democratic Choice (established in the 
aftermath of  the “color revolutions” in Ukraine 
and Georgia) are overtly critical because the groups 
represent, in the eyes of  Moscow, the effects of  
an unfriendly “overlay” of  extra-regional forces 
(meaning the US) that seek to weaken and margin-
alize Russia in its “near abroad.”
Against this backdrop, Russia seems ready to play 
a realpolitik game of  power balancing in this 
region. But such power balancing would not be 
with the EU, but rather with the United States, 
which may cause some resentment in Black Sea 
countries. Thus, there are many authoritative voices 
in Ukraine claiming that Barack Obama’s admin-
istration is believed to have set aside a “regional 
balancing approach” for the sake of  “resetting” 
its bilateral relations with Moscow at the expense 
of  Washington’s engagement with Russia’s pro-
Western neighbors, including Ukraine.46 The same 
is true with regard to Georgia: many in Washing-
ton believe that Georgia’s privileged position as 
a “democratic client” state ultimately “prevented 
Washington from soberly assessing the deteriorat-
ing situation in the South Caucasus in the spring 
2008 run-up to the August war. Washington’s fail-
ure to restrain the Georgian leadership in August 
2008 is indicative of  the United States’ inability to 
translate its close ‘values-based’ relationship with 
Tbilisi into actual influence at the most critical of  
times.”47
Yet the US’s relative disengagement from countries 
in the Black Sea region did not strengthen Rus-
DGAPanalyse 1 | March 2012
12
sia’s hand. Of  course, Russia’s policies are meant 
to help maintain Russian supremacy in the region, 
which to Moscow is indispensable for the success-
ful implementation of  a multipolar world order. Yet 
Russia’s “multipolar world”—enforced through the 
Georgian war of  August 2008—may pose a threat 
to countries like Ukraine since, practically speaking, 
it is really the sum of  regional “unipolarities” based 
on the dominant power of  “regional leaders” and 
accepted by other major powers.48 Seen from this 
vantage point, the more Russia pushes its vision of  
multipolarity as a type of  global order, the more 
disadvantaged Russia’s neighbors will feel, which 
will result in stronger resistance to Russian plans. 
This is also true in the Caspian Sea region.
The Caspian Sea Region-to-Be
Structural factors. Arguably, the Caspian Sea region 
is an example of  a regional system-in-the-making 
because it lacks a societal policy framework that is 
exemplified in common rules and shared norms. 
The Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict as well as inter-
national sanctions against Iran are major structural 
impediments to the effective implementation of  
social mechanisms in the region. The domination 
of  geopolitical thinking and power balancing make 
the region a particular case of  a semi-peripheral 
regional system that balances between several 
power centers. Countries in the region have differ-
ent attitudes toward extra-regional powers: Russia 
and Iran are eager to prevent both the EU and US 
from interfering in intra-regional affairs, while oth-
ers are more open to external overlays. This could 
be an indication of  the weakness of  Caspian Sea 
regionalism, but it could also be a source of  its 
growing self-assertiveness vis-à-vis major centers 
of  power.
The Caspian Sea region may thus be viewed as a 
regional security complex aimed at the gradual for-
mation of  a common space for security relations 
based on joint commitments. Compared to other 
regions, the Caspian Sea region has a rather specific 
common agenda—namely, the establishment of  a 
sea-sharing regime. The key agenda-setting issue—
the delineation of  the sea floor among the five 
littoral states—requires a set of  rules that must be 
established regionally, including littoral states’ obli-
gation to prevent using their territory for unfriendly 
actions against other regional members; the 
exclusive rights of  regional sovereigns to exploit 
resources; national flags for fishing and shipping; 
and exceptional rights for navigation reserved for 
littoral states.49
Russia’s policies. Russian strategy in the Caspian Sea 
region can be explained through the concept of  
a “great power region,” which is constructed and 
cemented by the dominating power. Russia has 
made great efforts to increase its influence in power 
politics with the Caspian countries. It encourages 
the strengthening of  Iran in order “to prevent the 
United States from becoming a more successful 
player in the broader Middle East.”50 Moscow has 
also tried to make use of  the anti-Western turn by 
the President of  Azerbaijan who, in light of  the 
Arab Spring, can be “treated as another corrupt 
autocrat whose term could expire any day.”51
External forces include not only states but also 
trans-national companies,52 some of  which have a 
negative reputation in Russia. In particular, Russian 
experts have complained that the United States is 
using environmental programs to boost its influ-
ence in the Caspian Sea region.53 In the same 
vein, the idea of  dividing the Caspian Sea among 
national sectors is treated as a move that will facili-
tate an increased role for Western oil companies in 
the region, a vital area of  US/NATO interests.54
In pursuing an inward-oriented strategy of  regional 
self-sufficiency, Russia has workable bilateral rela-
tions with the four other littoral states of  the 
Caspian Sea. However, these bilateral policies are 
conducive neither to greater cohesiveness within 
the regional environment nor to stronger solidar-
ity among the potential members of  a regional 
society. This means that Russia will not be able to 
have a monopoly in the Caspian region and will 
have to accept that other major powers—the EU, 
US, China, and Turkey—will increasingly compete 
for influence and resources. Russia’s integration 
resources are quite limited and are insufficient for 
realizing its leadership ambitions. Yet it is the fear 
of  Russian domination among other littoral states 
that ultimately paves the way for external over-
lays, which, as in the case of  the Black Sea region, 
mostly concern US and NATO policies. As an 
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American scholar admits, “a primary objective of  
America’s Caspian policy will continue to be con-
tainment of  Russian influence in the southern tier, 
including opposition to perceived Russian efforts 
to exert coercive military or economic pressure on 
the developing states of  the region. Indeed, per-
ceptions of  such Russian hegemonic conduct have 
mounted in the US policy-making community with 
the emergence of  President Putin’s more assertive 
approach to safeguarding Russian interests in the 
‘near abroad.’”55 Yet this logic may push “Russia 
and Iran together to obstruct developments in Cas-
pian Sea oil” that favor Western companies.56 That 
is why the combination of  balancing and contain-
ment is not conducive to promoting regional inte-
gration, which would necessitate a more inclusive 
approach that engages both Russia and Iran.57
Comparing the Four Cases: 
Analytical Conclusions
There are several important issues that the region-
focused analysis has helped elucidate.
First, regional policies from Russia and the EU 
seriously differ from each other in terms of  inter-
ests and approaches. For the EU, regionalism is 
important in terms of  “breaking up the dualism of  
enlargement/inclusion and neighborhood/exclu-
sion policies … and coming up with hybrid solu-
tions that are at the same time inside and outside 
of  overlapping communities.”58 It is in the interests 
of  the EU to project the normative experiences of  
regional integration within Europe beyond its bor-
ders. In fact, through a “mosaic of  dialogues and 
far-reaching multilateral cooperation mechanisms,” 
the EU can promote “shared governance struc-
tures” that consist of  concentric circles—from 
those neighbors which accept the acquis communau-
taire to those partners with whom legal harmoniza-
tion and convergence have to be negotiated.59 In 
sharp contrast to EU policies, the Kremlin mostly 
handles regions from a neorealist perspective, i. e. 
as instruments that states utilize for geopolitical 
purposes of  power maximization.
Yet it would be wrong to think that the EU always 
adheres to its “normative power” role, or that Rus-
sia is always a “realpolitik” type of  actor. It is only 
by addressing Russian and EU policies toward 
a variety of  region-building projects that we can 
comprehend the structural circumstances in which 
Moscow and Brussels deviate from the correspond-
ing logics of  realism and normativity. The EU may 
by necessity play by the rules of  realpolitik in the 
Caspian Sea region, while Russia may take more 
normative approaches to initiating, along with 
Poland, cross-border and visa facilitation projects 
on the regional level.
Second, in this paper I took a critical look at the 
policy connotations of  the concept of  external 
influence. While the Baltic Sea region is relatively 
immune to the involvement of  external pow-
ers (with exceptions such as the US’s North 
European Initiative), the Caspian Sea and Black 
Sea regions are much more exposed to external 
influences. Both regions give good illustrations 
of  how impractical are Russia’s efforts to block 
extra-regional interferences and search for purely 
regional solutions to a plethora of  unsolved issues 
of  security, development, and institution-building. 
It is doubtful that regional actors themselves—
without any influence from the West—would be 
able to provide stability in—and security to—the 
respective regions. On the contrary, for countries 
like Azerbaijan or Ukraine, it is critically important 
to convince the West in maintaining their high level 
of  interest in them.60 Ukraine displays particular 
sensitivity to the dynamics of  US-Russian rela-
tions; some argue that the bilateral “reset” policy 
of  Moscow and Washington makes Kiev feel that it 
is “left alone with a no less aggressive Russia, with 
no objection from Washington.”61 By the same 
token, Azerbaijan’s policies are heavily influenced 
by the dynamics of  Turkish-Armenian relations 
that, in their turn, depend on EU and US politi-
cal stances that are under heavy impacting by the 
Armenian diaspora. The Azerbaijan-Armenia talks 
are mediated by Switzerland, which clearly is an 
extra-regional power.
Third, a variety of  regional practices provides some 
food for thought about identities and institutions 
that would ideally harmonize the region-making 
process. But if  a common identity is missing, there 
are still possibilities to build regions on the basis 
of  adherence to common rules. The case of  the 
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Baltic Sea region demonstrates that the absence of  
a common identity (in terms of  language, religion, 
culture, and history) does not hinder the func-
tioning of  common institutions, most of  which 
gravitate toward the EU as the dominating power. 
The lack of  a normative hegemony, which is com-
parable to the EU’s role in the Baltic Sea, prevents 
effective region-building in the Black Sea and Cas-
pian Sea regions.
Fourth, regional cases show that there are differ-
ent overlays and different hegemonies. The EU 
is a hegemonic actor in the Baltic Sea region, yet 
this hegemony is not a hindrance, but rather an 
indispensable condition for region making. What 
matters is whether the major powers compete for 
influence or cooperate with each other. A region’s 
dominant structural model—system, society, or 
community—is also important. Against this back-
ground, it can be argued that in identity-based 
regions, the external overlay only plays a minimal 
role (as with the Nordic region), external overlay is 
more likely in institution-based regions (Black Sea 
region), while more under-institutionalized regional 
systems (such as the Caspian Sea region) will find 
that external overlay is inevitable, despite the isola-
tionist postures of  some regional actors.
Fifth, regional cases are instrumental in fleshing 
out a variety of  Russian policies in its near abroad, 
which do not necessarily submit to a single logic of  
integration. It is very likely that Russian policies in 
one of  these regions may contravene its policies in 
another region. Thus, Russia’s intention to reduce 
Ukraine’s role in the transit of  natural gas provoked 
different institutional effects in two regions: In the 
Baltic Sea region, Russia and Germany have fol-
lowed the model of  “great power management,” 
while in the Black Sea region, there is much stron-
ger competition between Russia and the EU for 
alternative energy projects.
Sixth, the region-making process can take different 
forms. In a first scenario, regions may be viewed 
as extensions of  multilateral agreements, or a 
move from a “pro-multilateral policy to intensi-
fied regionalism,”62 as exemplified by the Black 
Sea region-building project. Regions of  a sec-
ond type may come about due to pressure from 
external actors whose roles may be crucial. For 
instance, “the EU has certainly put pressure on 
Eastern European states to create new regions.”63 
Western support for regional-making may become 
a confidence-promoting and conflict-prevention 
mechanism, since the stimulation of  trans-/cross-
border projects ought to decrease the likelihood of  
military conflicts.64 The most illustrative case here 
is the Baltic Sea region. In a third scenario, regions 
may emerge as direct products of  the consolidation 
of  former marginal areas, a situation which might 
be dubbed “assertive regionalism.”
Policy Implications for Russia and 
the EU
Of  the three scenarios mentioned above, Russia 
would certainly prefer the first one, since it lacks 
the EU’s soft power instruments and does not 
welcome the uncontrolled self-assertion of  its 
neighbors in its “near abroad.” Though it is still 
quite unclear exactly how a model of  multilateral 
regionalism would look, it appears that Russia’s 
engagement with the EU will play a crucial role in 
each particular case. However, the overall prospects 
for the near future are not very promising. In the 
coming years, Russia will most likely concentrate its 
resources more on solidifying and even expanding 
the Customs Union than on searching for com-
mon ground with the EU across their common 
border. The European Union, for its part, will not 
be institutionally capable of  upgrading and reset-
ting its “Eastern policy” due to its current focus on 
its internal problems (above all the eurozone crisis) 
and the growing salience of  post-Arab Spring polit-
ical and security issues. It is quite indicative that 
Poland, the architect of  the “Eastern Partnership,” 
shifted its policy priorities from Eastern Europe 
to the intra-European arena by the end of  its EU 
rotating presidency in the second half  of  2011, in 
an effort to invigorate the nascent German-Polish 
political nexus.65
Yet it is exactly at this juncture that opportunities 
arise for EU-Russian interaction in their common 
neighborhood. The German-Polish-Russian infor-
mal “triangle” has a chance to become a working 
(though weakly institutionalized) model of  joint 
management for some regional issues. However, 
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the cooperative spirit of  the European partners 
will be directly affected by Russia’s ability to deliver 
policy changes at the regional level. Unfortunately, 
it is at this point that Moscow’s power in its “near 
abroad” comes into question. It is indicative that 
despite its explicit political rhetoric, the Kremlin 
was unable to prevent the former President of  
Transnistria, Igor Smirnov, from running for reelec-
tion. Germany regards the breakaway region as 
a test case for German-Russian security relations 
in wider Europe. Along with Moscow’s failure to 
implement its policies during the presidential elec-
tion in South Ossetia, these two cases illustrate how 
weak Russian is, even in territories that are eco-
nomically dependent on Russia.
Yet even with Russia as a weak partner, the EU can 
find some areas of  mutual interest in the common 
neighborhood. It is more or less clear what these 
common points might be in the Baltic Sea region: 
the co-management of  energy project(s) and the 
revitalization of  the idea of  Kaliningrad as a “pilot 
project” for EU-Russian relations. It is much less 
clear how the joint “ownership” of  regional initia-
tives might look in the Black Sea region, where 
Russia lacks a policy vision comparable to the EU’s 
Black Sea Synergy. The common denominator for 
both parties could be a strategy of  de-securitizing 
the Black Sea region, which seems to be consonant 
with Russian sensitivities to the forthcoming Sochi 
Olympics in 2014, and with the EU’s legacy of  
playing a mediating role in the August 2008 conflict 
between Russia and Georgia. As far as the Caspian 
Sea region is concerned, the contours of  the EU-
Russian common agenda remain unclear. Both par-
ties could potentially pool their resources in order 
to prevent military conflicts in this part of  their 
shared neighborhood, focus their efforts on help-
ing bring Iran more in line with the international 
community, and engage Azerbaijan in a denser 
set of  political and economic relations that would 
reduce the likelihood of  a new military conflict 
with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
For the EU, the effectiveness of  EU-Russian 
cooperation will to a large extent depend upon the 
compatibility of  their respective visions for the 
common neighborhood. Should the EU prefer to 
ground its policy in imagining/constructing the 
regions of  the South Caucasus and Central Asia, 
Russia’s role in these projects would be more of  an 
external power than of  a co-participant. And vice 
versa, the EU’s focus on the Black Sea and Caspian 
Sea regions will necessitate the search for common 
solutions that, in my view, have to be based on the 
possible spill-over effects of  specific political or 
economic initiatives. For example, the experience 
of  EUBAM (European Union’s Border Assistance 
Mission, operating on the Ukrainian-Moldovan 
border to control smuggling) clearly demonstrates 
that the EU’s “external governance” in the com-
mon neighborhood may be beneficial for local 
countries as well as Russia. Politically, much will 
depend on whether the December 2011 presiden-
tial election in Transnistria will trigger progress 
in the German-Russian Meseberg initiative. In 
Abkhazia, one of  the decisive factors is whether 
the much-discussed policy of  “engagement with-
out recognition” will somehow materialize, and 
whether it may be considered as an acceptable 
option by Moscow. In the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, since both Russia and EU are interested in 
avoiding hostilities, they may diplomatically coordi-
nate the signals they send to the conflicting parties 
in the expectation that greater economic engage-
ment will lead to more political responsiveness. It 
is only through these bilaterally coordinated policy 
tracks that both Russia and the EU can make their 
common neighborhood safer.
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